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1Basic Aspects of VAT
Introduction
Objectives and Conclusions
The purpose of this report is to study the value-added tax 
(VAT) to see how it could or would be applied in the United 
States.
The report considers whether an indirect tax such as a VAT 
should be used to provide for significant increases in federal reve­
nue in lieu of increasing direct taxes (corporate and individual 
income taxes). It notes that besides providing additional revenues, 
the imposition of an indirect tax in lieu of increasing direct taxes 
would make U.S. goods more competitive in the world market 
with goods exported by European countries that rely heavily on 
an indirect tax system.
The question of whether an indirect tax should take the form 
of a retail sales tax or a VAT is examined. The report concludes 
that a federally administered, comprehensive retail sales tax is 
the preferred choice. However, if a VAT is chosen, it should be a 
single-rate consumption type covering capital purchases, with as 
few exemptions as possible.
Finally, if an indirect tax is imposed at the federal level, the 
report suggests that consideration should be given to placing with 
the federal government the responsibility for collection and ad­
ministration of similar taxes now imposed and administered at 
the state level.
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Underlying all discussions of VAT are three aspects: economic, 
political, and administrative. For example, the question of the 
eff ect of VAT on price stability is an important economic consid­
eration; its burden on consumers, a political one; and its ease or 
diff i culty of collection, an administrative one. Some specifics of 
these three aspects are brought out in this report together with 
commentary where considered necessary or desirable.
What Is VAT?
VAT is an indirect tax—that is, it is a tax that is levied only in­
directly on persons since it is levied directly on the goods and 
services supplied to a person; it thus differs from a tax which is 
levied directly on persons. Indirect taxes would include retail 
sales taxes, excise taxes, and import duties; direct taxes would in­
clude individual and corporate income taxes and inheritance taxes. 
Theoretically, VAT is a tax on the value added to goods or ser­
vices by each separate processor in the production and distribu­
tion chain. Actually, and functionally, it is a tax on the increase 
in the sales price of the goods or services as they pass through 
that chain. But ultimately, it is a tax on consumption—on the 
amount spent for the product by the final consumer since ulti­
mately he bears the burden of the tax, even though the actual 
payor of the tax to a government is the manufacturer or processor.
At its simplest, each processor collects a tax on his sales of 
goods or services, deducts from the taxes as collected the amount 
of taxes he has paid, and remits the difference to the government. 
If he pays more tax than he collects, he receives a refund.
There are three types of VAT classified according to their 
treatment of purchases of capital items—the consumption type, 
the gross product type, and the income type.
The consum ption  type is the tax used in the Common Market 
and is the type most frequently discussed in this country. Under 
the consumption type, a purchaser of capital items is entitled to 
deduct the tax paid on such items from collections of VAT just 
as he does for tax paid on all other purchases.
Under the gross product type, no deduction would be allowed 
for tax paid on capital items; it can only be recovered by the 
payor through an increase in the selling price of the goods pro­
duced directly or indirectly by the capital item.
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Under the incom e type, recovery of the VAT paid would be 
allowed ratably over the life of the asset; thus VAT paid on the 
purchase of a capital item with a five-year life would be recov­
ered one-fifth in the year of purchase and one-fifth in each of the 
following four years. The consumption type will be the only one 
considered in detail here.
Why Is VAT Significant Today?
The primary reason for VAT’s initial consideration in the 
United States was its success in operation and increasing use 
throughout Europe. When it is considered that Europe is a major 
competitor of the United States in the world market, the effect 
of VAT on trade becomes significant. Its apparent incentive for 
companies to export created interest in the tax because of U.S. 
balance-of-payments problems. However, as will be seen, a VAT 
itself does not increase exports; it is, after all, a tax and needs to 
be compared with an alternative tax to determine its effect on 
exports.
More important than VAT’s success in operation in Europe is 
its revenue-producing potential—something highly attractive to a 
government facing substantial deficits in current and future fiscal 
years. This potential is highlighted by comparing the forecasted 
yield from a VAT to the revenues produced by U.S. income 
taxes. Income tax yields are as follows.
Table I
Individual
Corporate
Actual Est. Est.
1973 1974 1975
(billions o f dollars)
103 118 129
36 39 48
Most studies maintain that a 1 percent VAT levied on the gross 
national product of the private sector (with exemptions for food 
and medical care) would yield approximately $6 billion. Thus, a 
6 percent VAT could yield as much as corporate income tax col­
lections for 1973. (See Exhibit 1, p. 45, for income tax yields.)
The magnitude of the revenues that the United States might 
realize were it to adopt a VAT structure comparable to the Euro­
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pean countries is illustrated by the following standard rates of 
value-added tax presently employed.
Table 2
Country Percent
Belgium 18
Denmark 15
France 20
Germany 11
Luxembourg 10
Netherlands 16
Norway 20
Sweden 17.65
United Kingdom 8
( See Exhibit 2, p. 46, for a complete list of rates. )
Even at the lowest rate of tax shown above (8  percent), VAT 
would generate as much revenue as the present corporate income 
tax.
In assessing VAT, comparisons to the tax burden and revenue 
sources of other countries have frequently been made. In this 
connection, Exhibit 3, p. 47, shows the percentage of taxes col­
lected by various countries in relation to their gross national prod­
ucts. Exhibit 4, p. 48, shows the percentage of total revenues col­
lected from different types of taxes.
From these exhibits, it can be concluded that the United States 
depends on income taxation, particularly corporate income taxa­
tion, to a greater extent than most other developed countries. 
Thus, our exports bear a greater share of the overall tax burden, 
resulting in a competitive disadvantage—but one that is difficult 
to measure.
In terms of Gross National Product (GNP), the United States 
does not appear to tax as heavily as most other countries. There­
fore, the statistics seem to indicate U.S. ability to support a rise 
in taxation. However, if the United States increased its total tax 
revenues by $30 billion (approximately 2 percent of GNP) through 
additional income taxes, whether by closing loopholes or by in­
creasing rates or by a combination of the two, the U.S. statistics
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in Exhibit 3 would compare to those for several countries whose 
economies are similar, as follows:
Table 3
Tax Revenues As a Percentage of GNP*
Country
Consump­
tion
Total Taxes on Incom e Taxes
Social
Security
Contribution
Germany 35.97 11.77 12.07 12.13
U.K. 34.73 13.61 15.72 5.40
Canada 33.53 15.19 15.42 2.92
U.S. 31.06 15.56 9.75 5.75
If, instead, the $30 billion were raised through indirect taxes, 
the same modification of Exhibit 3 would have shown the follow­
ing:
Table 4
Tax Revenues As a Percentage of GNP
Country
Consump­
tion
Total Taxes on Incom e Taxes
Social
Security
Contribution
Germany 35.97 11.77 12.07 12.13
U.K. 34.73 13.61 15.72 5.40
Canada 33.53 15.19 15.42 2.92
U.S. 31.06 12.56 12.75 5.75
Because the other countries shown currently raise less revenues 
in terms of GNP from income taxes and more from consumption 
taxes, an attempt to raise additional revenues through income 
taxes would carry the U.S. even further away from those more 
comparable economies even though total tax revenue in the U.S. 
as a percentage of GNP would still remain the lowest. What 
effect this would have on our competitive position in world mar-
* Source of all comparative tax statistics in this report is Revenue Statistics 
of OECD Member Countries 1965-1972.
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kets is not known; nor is the eff ect it would have on taxpayer 
morale and attitude towards compliance. These would be two 
areas of concern.
In any event, it should be acknowledged that no standard of 
proper mix of direct and indirect taxation could ever be estab­
lished applicable to all countries for all periods of time. Probably 
the safest observation is that U.S. taxpayers might better tolerate 
an increase in indirect taxes of $30 billion rather than such an 
increase in income taxes if they are compared to the citizens of 
Canada, Germany, and the U.K. In those countries there is pres­
ently no great spread between income taxes and consumption 
taxes as a percentage of GNP, although the percentage of con­
sumption taxes in each case exceeds the percentage of income 
taxes. The United States, by increasing consumption taxes rather 
than income taxes, would bring its percentages in line with the 
other countries. An increase in income taxes would put the United 
States further out of line with those other countries. The proba­
bility that U.S. taxpayers might tolerate an increase in indirect 
taxes seems to be supported, too, by a nationwide opinion poll, 
conducted on behalf of the Advisory Commission on Intergovern­
mental Relations. This showed that 46 percent of the general 
public believe that if state governments must raise taxes substan­
tially, they should increase indirect taxes on sales.
How VAT Works
Common System
In theory, VAT works in a simple fashion. (See Exhibit 5, p. 
49.) Normally, the tax-collecting chain begins with the sale of 
raw materials upon which VAT is charged by the seller at a fixed 
rate and remitted by him to the government. The purchasing 
manufacturer thereafter charges VAT again on his sale of the 
finished or semifinished product to another manufacturer or a dis­
tributor. However, instead of remitting the total collection to the 
government, the manufacturer is entitled to reimburse himself 
for the VAT paid upon his purchase of the raw material. Only 
the difference, or the tax on the “value added” by the manufac­
turer, is paid to the government. The process is repeated by the 
second manufacturer or the distributor when he in turn makes a
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sale in the business cycle; VAT is charged on the total sales price, 
the seller reimburses himself from the proceeds, and only the 
difference is remitted to the government. When a final sale is 
made—usually by a retailer to the ultimate consumer—the tax may 
or may not be shown separately, for at this point the chain comes 
to an end.
While the retailer is entitled to a reimbursement for VAT previ­
ously paid, the purchaser, who in his capacity as the consumer of 
the item acquired is not in the business of selling goods or ser­
vices, must bear the full tax cost. Thus, the VAT cost is passed 
through each business operation until it is paid in the purchase 
price by the retail consumer or client. It is intended to be a tax 
that is passed on to the ultimate consumer, although the effect of 
the VAT rate on the price the market will bear may in some cases 
force a seller to reduce his profit margin.
It should be noted that the pass-through of the VAT cost ap­
plies to all purchases made by a business. Thus, VAT paid on an 
electrical bill, or on stationery supplies, or charged with legal and 
accounting fees all may be recovered on collections of VAT made 
on billings of the enterprise. The system, therefore, depends heav­
ily on adequate invoicing, which sets out VAT as a separate item 
up until the final sale for ostensibly private consumption.
Rates
The fewer the exceptions or modifications, the easier the system 
operates. Nevertheless, all the systems presently operating in 
Europe do grant “relief” to certain types of sales, generally in one 
of three possible forms:
1. The sale is taxed at a reduced rate (multiple-rate system).
2. The sale is exempt.
3. The taxable base is reduced.
At this time Sweden is the only country applying the third 
method.
M ultiple Rates. Permitting two or more rates of VAT within 
a single production chain may or may not decrease total tax paid. 
If there is a standard rate of 3 percent and a reduced rate of I 
percent, total tax paid would not change as long as the standard
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rate is applied at the end of the chain. For instance, if an item 
were purchased for $100 in a transaction to which the reduced 
rate (1 percent) applied, one dollar of VAT would be collected 
and remitted. If the item were thereafter sold for $400 in a trans­
action in which a standard rate (3 percent) applied, the normal 
twelve dollars would be collected, the seller would reimburse him­
self for the one dollar previously paid and remit eleven dollars 
to the government. The effect in such a case is merely to shift 
forward the total collection of tax. If, however, the situation were 
reversed and the normal rate applied to the $100 purchase- 
meaning that a VAT of three dollars was paid upon acquisition— 
and the reduced rate applied to the $400 sale—meaning that only 
four dollars in VAT was collected upon the second transaction- 
then total VAT collected would drop from twelve to four dollars. 
Thus, a reduced rate at the end of a chain will also reduce total 
VAT collected. (See Exhibits 6 and 7, pp. 50 and 51.)
Exemptions. Although the system might operate more easily 
if exemptions were kept to a minimum, there would be a number 
of operations in most countries which would be placed outside 
the system. These would include very small, probably retail, 
enterprises with a marginal annual turnover, financial transactions 
(life insurance, banking, security purchases, and sales), medical 
and educational services, charitable activities, newspaper, periodi­
cal, and book sales, and sales of agricultural products and food. 
While these enterprises are required to pay VAT on most of their 
purchases, they are not required to charge the tax on their sales. 
The primary result of the exemption, then, is that they cannot 
recoup VAT paid through charges for the tax on their sales. VAT 
paid becomes a cost of doing business just like any other cost.
Where the business sells mostly at retail, the inability to recover 
VAT in the normal course may not be a disadvantage, because 
VAT is also not charged on the “value added” by the exempt 
person or entity. Where profit margins are sufficiently high, an 
exemption can even prove to be a competitive advantage. Thus, 
while a small exempt retailer may purchase an item for $100 and 
pay a 3 percent VAT just as a larger taxable retailer, his price to a 
retail customer need not include VAT, and thus can be less than 
the amount charged by the larger retailer. For instance, if the 
larger retailer’s resale price was $200, he would have to charge
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$206 (assuming a 3 percent VAT), recovering the three dollars 
paid earlier and remitting the three dollars levied on his profit 
to the government. The smaller exempt retailer could charge 
something less and perhaps still make the same profit, depending 
on operating costs. His price would have to cover VAT costs on 
purchases, but not VAT on the resale.
In some cases, activities normally exempt may wish to have the 
option to elect to be covered, especially if small profit margins 
don’t give them any real advantage over their larger taxable com­
petitors. Such elections are permitted for some activities in a 
number of European systems. Other activities, like farming, may 
be granted a reduced rate that does not affect prices as substan­
tially as other rates but does permit the activity to recover VAT 
paid on purchases, if not from VAT collected on sales, then from 
the government by way of refunds. Such variants complicate the 
system, of course, but seem to be widespread. Businesses that are 
both exempt on certain lines of activity and taxable on others also 
present special problems requiring purchases to be prorated be­
tween exempt and taxable sales so that VAT recovery is limited 
to those purchases that can be related to taxable sales.
When a person or entity is exempt and makes a sale to a tax­
able person (that is, a sale that is not at retail), the taxable pur­
chaser, not being charged (directly, at least) for VAT, cannot 
reimburse himself for that cost upon resale. Thus, if the price 
charged for an item by an exempt seller was $100, which in fact 
covered two dollars of VAT paid earlier in the chain, and the tax­
able purchaser in turn sold the item for $200 in a sale to which a 
3 percent value-added tax applied, the latter would collect six 
dollars and remit the entire amount to the government. As a re­
sult, total VAT paid would come to eight rather than only six 
dollars, the total tax paid in the normal case. An exempt stage in 
the course of a business chain has the effect, therefore, of in­
creasing total tax paid because the taxable purchaser from an 
exempt seller is not entitled to reimburse himself for VAT that 
may have been paid on the item before he acquired it. That is, if 
an exempt seller is selling to the ultimate consumer, he could 
have a competitive advantage over a nonexempt seller of the 
same product; conversely, if he is selling to a nonexempt reseller 
who is not the ultimate consumer, he would suffer competitive 
disadvantage. ( See Exhibit 8, p. 52.)
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Zero Rate. In some cases, the government finds it desirable to 
allow a refund or credit for prior VAT paid, even though a sub­
sequent sale is exempt. One method of overcoming the adminis­
trative problems involved in refunding or crediting taxes paid on 
purchases when the subsequent sale is exempt is by use of a zero 
rate. For example, if export sales are exempted, that is of no 
great benefit to the exporter unless he can recover the taxes he 
paid on purchases attributable to the export. Rather than having 
two categories of exempt sales, (1 ) tax recoverable and (2) non- 
recoverable, the zero rating, which is in essence an exempt, tax- 
recoverable sale, has been devised. This way, all truly exempt 
sales will be in the nonrecoverable category.
Refunds and Credits
Where a business is just commencing, or where it has heavy 
export or other exempt or zero rated sales, it is possible for its 
collections of VAT on sales to be materially less than it paid on 
purchases. In cases of this type, the government may refund the 
difference on a monthly or quarterly basis, or it may require the 
entity to carry forward the unreimbursed VAT against sales of 
later periods. In such a case, if sales by the entity do not incur 
sufficient VAT to offset VAT paid on purchases both currently 
and on a carry-over basis, the unrecovered tax obviously becomes 
a cost to the enterprise. Generally speaking, the refund system is 
preferred over that requiring an enterprise to recover its VAT 
on a credit basis over an extended period of time.
Capital Goods
One interesting feature of VAT as it is usually applied is that 
purchases of capital goods are included within the system. Thus, 
manufacturers’ purchases of machinery and equipment would 
generally be subject to the normal rate, which would be recov­
ered currently by VAT collected on sales of manufactured goods. 
While permitting full current recovery of VAT on capital goods 
is the usual system (consumption), some authorities argue that 
VAT on such items ought not to be recovered at all ( gross prod­
uct system) or VAT should be recovered only over the life of the 
asset on an annual pro rata basis (income system). While the 
last two systems have not been generally accepted, most coun­
tries that have introduced VAT have provided transitional rules
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with respect to VAT paid on capital goods. Thus, in the first year 
of the new VAT system only a partial recovery of VAT paid on 
capital goods is permitted, while in the second year, an addi­
tional amount is allowed, and so forth until all VAT paid on such 
items is reimbursed. This phase-in to a full-consumption VAT has 
been effected because allowing full recovery of the tax immedi­
ately could seriously affect the capital goods market where VAT 
replaced a sales tax that was not recoverable. The impact on tax 
revenues is another reason for going gradually to a full consump­
tion system. Under a sales tax no part of the tax on capital goods 
would be recovered, but under a VAT all of it would be recov­
ered in the year of sale. Yet the VAT on the sales resulting from 
use of the capital equipment would be spread over many years.
General Advantages and Disadvantages of VAT
In speaking out in favor of a federal value-added tax, Dan 
Throop Smith, former Treasury official in charge of tax policy in 
the Eisenhower Administration, called it “the least bad” tax.1 His 
successor in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Stanley 
Surrey, viewed it as an undesirable addition to the tax laws and 
referred to it as “a second best tax.”2 These differing views, attest­
ing to how controversial the VAT is, appear all through the dis­
cussions in the last several years as VAT has come under consid­
eration in the United States.
It is difficult to talk about VAT in the abstract because the prob­
lems arising from its adoption depend largely on what taxes, if 
any, are replaced. Obviously, the incidence and impact of the 
tax would vary if it supplanted the employment taxes, for exam­
ple, as compared with reducing the corporate income tax. The 
recent suggestion that a VAT be used to supplant some residen­
tial real estate taxes could well have another, entirely different 
overall effect. In concept, however, the tax itself has certain ad­
vantages and certain disadvantages that are stressed in the widen­
ing debate over future tax policy in the United States.
1 Smith, “The Case For Value-Added Tax,” 48-6 Harvard Business Review 
77 (1970).
2 Stanley Surrey, “A Value-Added Tax for the United States—A Negative 
View,” The Tax Executive, (April 1969) p. 151.
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The proponents of a VAT frequently see its adoption as a means 
of raising the billions needed by the federal government to finance 
growing budget deficits and the growing demands of state and 
local jurisdictions. They note its rapid spread in Europe and be­
lieve it will create a better balance in our tax system citing the 
following main advantages of a VAT:
• Large potential for revenue
• More stable revenues
• Neutral in application
• Encouragement of efficient resource allocation
• Encouragement of saving
• Ease of administration
• Incentive for exports
• Contribution to a proper tax mix
The opponents of a federal VAT believe our present tax system 
works remarkably well and believe it to be capable of raising 
the needed billions in revenue if loopholes were closed, inequi­
ties removed, and the base broadened. They see no need to emu­
late the Europeans in tax policy, and as Stanley Surrey has stated, 
“After all, the American Revolution was fought in part to win the 
right to determine our own tax system.” The major deficiencies 
in the VAT emphasized by its opponents are as follows:
• Too large a revenue potential
• Lack of counter-cyclical balance
• Inequitable to new or marginal enterprises
• Hidden from taxpayers
• Inflationary effect on prices
• Difficulties of administration
• No incentive for exports
• Brings regression into the tax mix
Analysis of Advantages
L arge Potential for  Revenue. That a federal VAT has a tre­
mendous potential for revenue is obvious. Consumption provides 
a much greater base than any other federal tax system presently 
employed. Its value base can be as large as the gross national 
product. As noted above, even allowing for exemptions for vital
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necessities and certain industries and groups, it has been estimated 
that each percentage point of VAT would bring in between 5 
and 6 billion dollars. Thus a low tax rate of 6 percent would 
bring in about as much as the corporate income tax. It also brings 
in taxpayers not now subject to tax or subject to lower taxes 
under other systems currently administered. Expenditures by 
organizations exempt from income tax would be subject to VAT. 
Individuals living off capital or tax-exempt income would pay a 
VAT. Thus, expenditures made from receipts under the social 
security system or from income from state obligations would 
become taxable. Appreciation of net worth, which results in a 
higher standard of living, would be taxed even though the gains 
were not themselves realized.
More Stable Revenues. In addition to the large potential for 
revenues, VAT, not being dependent on profits, would also avoid 
the fluctuations of our present tax system and result in a more 
stable and predictable basis of federal income.
Neutral in Application. It is recognized that neutrality means 
different things to different people. From a VAT standpoint, neu­
trality appears to mean that business decisions are not deter­
mined or largely influenced by tax factors.
VAT, being based on the selling price of products, does not 
favor capital-intensive over labor-intensive industries. The prod­
ucts of efficient as well as inefficient companies would bear the 
same tax as contrasted, for example, with an income tax, which 
only profitable enterprises pay. This “price umbrella” effect 
presently is said to subsidize the marginal producer at the ex­
pense of the taxpayers at large. A share of government services 
and resources used by a business would be paid for whether the 
business had profits or not.
The use of equity financing or debt financing would not affect 
the tax except as their elements were passed on in price. Present 
income tax incentives would be nullified. The form of business 
organization would not affect the tax. Proprietorships, partner­
ships, and other ventures would all bear the same tax burden on 
their products or services, creating neutrality in business for­
mation.
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Encourages Efficient Resource Allocation. The neutrality 
really results from the fact that there is no tax as such on the 
business itself but only on the end product or service. Thus, all 
advantages lie in reducing the total costs of the business reflected 
in the ultimate selling price. While there is a similar advantage 
under an income tax system, expenditure can also be influenced 
by deductibility for income tax purposes. It has been alleged that, 
freed of an inducement to wasteful spending under an income 
tax system, business would be encouraged to a more efficient allo­
cation of resources. Thus, the imposition of a VAT could well 
lead to modernization of plant with consequently lower unit costs. 
Other measures such as investment credit incentives and fast 
write-offs, which are sometimes discriminatory and uneconomic 
and always politically vulnerable, would not be necessary under 
a VAT.
Encourages Saving. A tax on consumption, since it is only in­
curred when money is spent, puts a premium on savings—as con­
trasted with the bias against savings inherent in an income tax 
where part of the income itself must be paid over to the govern­
ment and cannot be saved. Those who believe that capital forma­
tion will be severely strained to meet the demands of the future 
see this as a prime advantage of VAT.
Ease o f  Administration. A VAT is relatively easy to admin­
ister. The self-policing aspects of the tax have proved to be 
sound in application. The tax schemes recently brought to light 
in France, for example, where fraudulent invoices were used, 
could just as easily have taken place in an income tax system. In 
any event, good common sense auditing would readily catch 
cheating in a VAT system.
Such auditing as performed by the tax authorities could con­
centrate more heavily on the retail sector. At lower stages of dis­
tribution, deficiencies at one level would merely be recouped by 
the government at the next level. Losses at the retail level would 
be permanent losses, however, and auditing—at least based on a 
review of taxes collected on a markup over taxes paid—would be 
necessary.
The reporting and record-keeping requirements naturally de­
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pend on the number of rates employed, exemptions granted, and 
rebates allowed. In the ideal VAT system with a single rate and 
few exemptions, the accounting procedures would be relatively 
simple. I
Incentive for Exports. The prime reason for the institution 
of the VAT in Europe was the desire to harmonize taxes on ex­
ports within the Common Market. The use of exemptions or a 
zero rate on exports removes the tax inhibitions and inequities on 
trade and ensures a uniform tax burden in each jurisdiction. This 
same rationale extends beyond the EEC and encompasses all 
countries signatory to the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (G A TT). Under GATT, all indirect taxes on export trans­
actions may be rebated and are not treated as export subsidies, 
which are prohibited.
Export products of a country that relies heavily on indirect 
taxes carry less of the overall tax burden and may have a com­
petitive trade advantage. T he imposition of a VAT, however, 
does not create this advantage, but to the extent the tax substi­
tutes for another tax, such as an income tax not rebatable under 
GATT, an incentive to exports is achieved. ( See Exhibit 9, p. 53.)
Initially, the VAT in Europe largely substituted for other in­
direct turnover taxes that were rebated on exports. Recently, 
however, the rates of VAT have been increased in some countries 
and other taxes on employment or income reduced. Whether 
these changes, coupled particularly with currency revaluations, 
will result in competitive pressures is very difficult to determine.
Contributes to a Proper Tax Mix. Because of the question of 
taxpayer morality that arises when an income tax is levied at too 
high a rate, and because of a corporate income tax’s possible 
effect on exports, it has been said that a mix of several different 
taxes is more likely to meet the tests of a good tax structure than 
is undue reliance on income as the measure of tax liability. In 
seeking an equitable balance in the overall system, many econo­
mists and tax advisers believe that taxes on wealth and spending 
should become a more important source of federal revenues. Cer­
tainly other countries have taken this course, and there is evi­
dence that where more revenue is needed an indirect tax might 
be preferred to increases in direct taxes.
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Analysis of Disadvantages of VAT
Too Large a  Revenue Potential. As has already been pointed 
out, an important question is how the federal government should 
raise substantial amounts of additional revenue needed in the 
future. It has been estimated that in order to equal a VAT of 
3 percent, the corporate rate would have to be raised to 65 per­
cent. If both corporate and individual rates were adjusted, it 
would require a surcharge of about 12.5 percent. Under the cir­
cumstances, it can be realized why some government officials are 
favorably inclined toward a continuing study of a VAT. Perhaps 
the most illuminating statement against the VAT was made by 
a long-time advocate of it, Dan Throop Smith; “If a VAT leads 
to excessive government spending which would not otherwise 
occur, the great revenue potential of VAT may be the best argu­
ment against i t .’’
L acks Counter-Cyclical Balances. The income tax is said to 
have the advantage of being a built-in stabilizer for counter­
cyclical fiscal policy. In boom periods it drains off more revenue 
from the private sector, dampening an overheated economy. On 
the downswing, of course, it has the reverse effect. The relative 
inelasticity of a VAT lacks this counter-cyclical aspect and, while 
not restraining a boom, it might even contribute to the decline 
in consumption in a recession.
Inequ itable to New or Marginal Enterprises. As was previ­
ously mentioned, the “price umbrella” effect of the corporate in­
come tax is said to benefit enterprises striving for maturity and 
profitability. If recognized as a desirable element in our federal 
structure, this is an acceptable cost to be borne by more efficient, 
mature industries. A VAT would remove the price umbrella and 
all products would carry the tax. To many, this would have the 
equitable result of requiring each business, regardless of its profit­
ability, to include a proportionate share of the federal tax burden 
in its billings for goods or services. Nevertheless, the new or mar­
ginal business might not be able to meet the price competition 
occasioned by a reduction of income taxes on profitable business 
and a replacement of tax through a VAT on all business.
H idden From  Taxpayers. As employed in Europe, the VAT is 
a hidden tax insofar as the consumer is concerned. However,
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there is nothing inherent in a VAT system requiring it to be un­
disclosed even at the consumer level. The tax can be separately 
indicated at all stages if desirable.
On the other hand, most taxes on business that are passed on 
ultimately to the consumer are hidden. To the extent it is shifted 
forward (which is another subject all by itself), the corporate 
income tax is hidden, as are federal and state taxes on payroll, 
ad valorem taxes on real estate, inventories, and other personal 
property, intangibles taxes, excise taxes, and the like. Many of 
these taxes are normally treated as direct costs of sales, and in 
some instances they are the largest single element of selling price 
—although hidden. There have been few serious demands that 
these taxes be shown separately, although some industries, such 
as petroleum, do break down the selling price of certain products 
at the retail level to reflect major direct taxes included therein.
Inflationary E ffects on Prices. A VAT, in concept, is inflation­
ary. It is an additional element of cost to be passed on directly 
to the consumer and thus increases the ultimate selling price. 
This cost-push principle makes the imposition of a VAT a some­
what dangerous undertaking. According to some economists, the 
chain reaction creates the possibility of an inflationary spiral.
Experience abroad has been mixed on the ultimate price effects 
of a VAT. Apart from the countries that merely substituted the 
VAT for other turnover taxes, it appears that in some instances 
the inflation being experienced was a result of the demand for 
goods exceeding supply rather than an increase in costs. It is pos­
sible that the institution of the VAT with its resulting higher 
price had a dampening effect on demand leading to increased 
prices not quite so high as the amount of the VAT.
Where the tax is a replacement for other taxes, the inflationary 
aspects might be minimal. This would also be true where govern­
ment expenditure policy reduces the need for personal outlays 
leaving a larger balance for normal consumption and/or savings, 
the latter of which is thought to be encouraged by a VAT’s great 
revenue-producing potential. Of course, the lower the tax rate, the 
lower the danger of inflationary aspects of a VAT. On the other 
hand, if the tax is substantial, both savings and consumption 
would drop unless taxpayers, through increased production, are 
able to increase their total income to compensate for the tax.
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Furthermore, increases in any federal tax sufficient to produce 
the same amount of revenue could also be argued to be inflation­
ary. To the extent that corporate tax is shifted forward, prices 
would rise; shareholders would not long sustain the burden of 
the tax without applying pressure for price increases. Personal 
income tax increases could lead to demands for wage adjustments. 
This might also be true for employment tax increases. Changes in 
excise taxes are usually passed forward directly. Accordingly, 
while a VAT has inherently inflationary tendencies, it may differ 
from other taxes in this regard only in that inflationary effects 
would be felt sooner rather than later.
Difficulties o f Administration
Too many new taxpayers The VAT, if applied throughout 
the economy, would naturally require the filing of millions of tax 
returns. This would also necessitate the keeping of countless rec­
ords and invoices, the employment of additional personnel, and 
the diversion of profitable hours to government business. While 
the filing of additional returns is not welcome, the job might 
largely be one of compilation of data currently being accumulated 
and even reported to the state governments, forty-six of which 
have a sales tax. Furthermore, any other tax of equal magnitude 
could well require as much or more attention and ultimate ad­
ministrative cost as the imposition of a VAT. In addition, a favor­
able cash flow is usually experienced by business under a VAT, 
in part offsetting compliance costs.
Interferes with state and local taxing jurisdictions State 
and local jurisdictions imposing a sales tax have a natural opposi­
tion to a tax on consumption by the federal government. Sales 
taxes in some states run as high as 7 percent and even a low-rate 
VAT could well have an inhibiting effect on sales and tax collec­
tions. However, some proponents of VAT, such as Professor Rich­
ard Lindholm of the University of Oregon, believe that a federal 
VAT is compatible with the state sales tax system and that in the 
long run they could be integrated with mutual advantages. The 
deductibility of state sales taxes for federal income tax purposes 
would, of course, be affected by this proposal.
In the meantime, the proposal to adopt a federal VAT for the 
purpose of state residential property tax relief would immediately
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project the federal government into the consumption area. It 
should be noted that in the past the federal luxury taxes and ex­
cise taxes have apparently worked side by side with state sales 
taxes without undue hardship or impediment to state taxing 
eff orts. Finally, proposals for revenue sharing and piggy-back col­
lections are signs of present congressional encouragement of a 
greater use of the income tax by states and localities. To the ex­
tent states take advantage of this latter source of revenue, con­
sumption taxation may open up to the federal government.
No Incentive for Exports. The export subsidy advantage for 
VAT has been challenged repeatedly. Since VAT is not directly a 
cost item to a producer, he obtains no direct benefits from its 
remission. It is true, however, that a national VAT is not included 
in a foreign sales price, thus permitting an exporter to charge 
what might be considered a more competitive price abroad. To 
this extent, exempting export sales from VAT can improve an ex­
porter’s ability to compete in a foreign market. On the other hand, 
if the country of destination imposes a VAT, any advantage at­
tributable to tax relief is obviously counteracted. Furthermore, 
even though a country imposes a VAT, it cannot be categorically 
maintained that the local remission of VAT amounts to a subsidy. 
Insofar as other tax costs, including the income tax, are compara­
ble to similar taxes imposed in competing countries, such as the 
United States, which has no VAT system, the effect of the rebate 
can be shown to be negligible. Imposing a VAT and then remit­
ting it on exports cannot act as a subsidy. However, VAT imposed 
in lieu of an income tax, or an income tax increase that would not 
be rebated, does shift overall tax costs from exported items and, 
in this context, can be said to favor exports although it is not an 
outright incentive for them.
Brings Regression into the U.S. Tax Mix. The opponents of a 
VAT generally feel that if the favorable arguments are to be be­
lieved, it is indeed a tax touchstone. As Professor Richard Mus­
grave has stated, it represents: “A business tax that business 
doesn’t pay, a consumer tax the consumer doesn’t see, and gov­
ernment services enjoyed by all without knowing who paid for 
them.” As already noted, there is consensus that a low rate of 
VAT would yield a high total of tax revenue. However, a prime
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concern is that this burden would be shouldered, largely, by the 
lower-income groups, who would be forced to spend a higher 
proportion of income. Thus, the tax is said to be regressive.
To counter the regression argument, proponents point out that, 
after giving consideration to the flow of government expenditures 
generated by a VAT, the real incomes of the low-income groups 
might be enhanced. When government expenditures, directly or 
indirectly, distribute proportionately greater benefits to the low- 
income groups than their aggregate contribution, the tax system 
employed should be considered progressive. Thus, family allow­
ances, student grants, pensions, medical payments, and similar 
social benefits, liberalized through VAT financing, could free in­
dividuals from having to save for those important contingencies.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that regressiveness can be 
overcome by credits or refunds, although no other country has 
employed such a system. On the other hand, exemptions for food, 
clothing, medicine, and other necessities are common under the 
European VAT systems, but they extend benefits beyond those 
needing relief and, like credits or refunds, add complexity.
The problem of regression is one that must be faced in consid­
ering the introduction of VAT into the U.S. tax system. The 
charge of regression cannot be entirely answered by pointing out 
that the present system, which relies on the income tax, is at 
least adequately progressive so that presumably it could stand 
a VAT, or that other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have 
introduced VAT where they had none before. Opponents of VAT 
counter that merely adequate progressiveness is insufficient and 
that the United Kingdom had to inaugurate a VAT to enter the 
Common Market whether it wanted to or not. Furthermore, what 
other countries do should not mean that we must do the same.
At the heart of the highly political charge of regression, how­
ever, is this fundamental question: Assuming (and the assump­
tions are important) that significant revenues are needed and that 
the income tax system cannot raise them without near confisca­
tory rates, what other tax is available other than a tax on con­
sumption? Further, there is evidence previously mentioned that 
individual taxpayers would rather have a tax of this sort, paid 
out piecemeal, than an income tax the payment of which looms so 
much larger.
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2Practical Aspects of VAT
Background
It  could be said that value-added tax is a creation of the Euro­
pean Economic Community. Outside the EEC, the only countries 
that imposed a VAT until recently were Norway and Sweden. 
Now Austria has it, and forms of a VAT are imposed in African 
and South American countries. It has been rejected in Canada 
and Japan as it was in the United Kingdom until that country 
accepted it in order to become a member of the EEC. To see how 
it has worked, then, we must look primarily to Europe and 
especially the EEC.
On April 11, 1967, the Council of the European Economic Com­
munity issued its first directive on the harmonization of its mem­
ber states’ turnover tax laws. It provided for the replacement of 
the present turnover tax systems by a value-added tax of the 
consumption type. At that time, only France had a value-added 
tax system; now, eight years later, all the nine member-countries 
have such a system, in conformity with the 1967 directive.
One of the interesting aspects of the initial directive was the 
provision that the tax should be levied up to and including the 
retail stage, except that the tax could stop at the wholesale stage 
until import duties were removed by the member states. If it 
stopped at the wholesale stage, it was suggested that a separate 
tax at the retail stage be levied to supplement the VAT. A few 
years earlier, the Fiscal and Financial Committee had been orga­
nized by the EEC to study the differences in the tax systems of 
the member states and to make recommendations on how to
21
overcome them. This committee recommended that a value-added 
tax up to but not including the retail stage should be adopted 
and suggested it be supplemented by a retail sales tax. In sub­
stance, then, the EEC Council followed the recommendation of 
the Fiscal and Financial Committee. It should be observed that 
the committee was not looking for the ideal tax system, but rather 
was concerned with the differences in the member states’ indirect 
tax systems and how best to harmonize them. This is a significant 
point and should be kept in mind when considering a VAT for 
use in the United States. The VAT was not necessarily found to 
be an ideal tax; rather, it was determined to be the best means 
for achieving the goal of harmonization. The committee pointed 
out that it would not be feasible to impose a retail sales tax as the 
only form of turnover tax, particularly because of the substantial 
number of small retail merchants who are unable to keep books. 
This may have been a euphemistic way of saying that tax collec­
tion would be difficult to enforce at the retail level; but, in any 
event, the retail sales tax was ruled out for practical reasons 
existing within the EEC.
On the date of the first directive, a second was also issued. This 
one concerned the structure of the VAT; it defined terms and laid 
down certain practical rules as to the tax base, exemptions, and 
deductions. While this directive left member states wide latitude 
in many areas, especially as to zero rating, the directive was spe­
cific enough in many other areas so that it left little alternative 
for the member states to take into account national peculiarities 
without getting permission to do so from the commission.
There is now in the proposal stage another directive that is in­
tended to resolve some of the questions left unanswered by the 
first two directives, especially in the area of services rendered. 
For example, in the earlier directives no mention was made of 
financial (including banking) and insurance services. This new 
directive ( in all probability the sixth1), if passed by the Council, 
will exempt financial and insurance transactions. It defines more 
precisely the method of taxing public transportation facilities. 
The agricultural areas, too, will be the subject of more specific 
instructions.
1 The third, fourth, and fifth directives, which are not reported here, dealt 
primarily with deadlines for member states switching to a VAT.
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Various Methods of Determining the VAT Base
Before getting into some of the specifics of how VAT operates 
in Europe, a brief comment about the various methods of deter­
mining the VAT base is worthwhile. There are three generally 
recognized methods of determining the tax base to which a value- 
added tax rate may be applied. These are known as (1 ) the in­
voice method, (2) the subtraction method, and (3) the addition 
method.
Only the invoice method has been employed by the members 
of the EEC  and other countries that have adopted VAT. Usually 
the other two methods, sometimes known as account methods, 
are dismissed as cumbersome and not nearly as readily subject 
to supervision and government control as is the invoice method. 
Nonetheless, it is worth quickly reviewing the other two concepts 
because they illustrate the principles of the tax in a different 
manner and thus throw additional light on how VAT works. In 
fact, the Michigan business activities tax (BA T) employed a 
variant of the subtraction method, and the proponents of VAT as 
a direct tax, in complete or partial substitution of the U.S. cor­
porate income tax, would presumably favor one or the other of the 
two methods to determine the tax base.
So that the three methods of determining a VAT liability may 
be compared with the more familiar income tax base calculation, 
a highly simplified profit and loss statement for income tax pur­
poses appears as Exhibit 10, p. 54. It should be noted that, for this 
purpose, beginning and ending inventory is limited to purchased 
material and that no attempt is made to assign overhead costs to 
inventory. This is because VAT theoretically depends on the kinds 
of expenditures made rather than on how they may be treated for 
normal accounting purposes. The various accounts reflected are 
identified according to whether they are utilized in determining a 
VAT liability under the invoice method, the subtraction method, 
or the addition method.
The second illustration merely summarizes the usual compari­
son that might be made to determine a net VAT liability for a 
period. (Exhibit 11, p. 55.) VAT collections on net sales are com­
pared with VAT payments on all purchases, including capital 
expenditures, which, of course, do not appear in the income tax 
base calculation. The net difference is the amount of tax col­
lected due the government.
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The third illustration, the subtraction method, utilizes the same 
accounts as the invoice method but the presentation is varied. 
(See Exhibit 12, p. 56.) Basically, the subtraction method is no 
more than a comparison of the accounts used to summarize the 
invoice method, but instead of substracting tax paid on purchases 
from the tax collected on sales, all purchases are itemized and 
subtracted from net sales to produce a tax base against which the 
rate is applied to produce the tax liability. As previously noted, 
the invoice method depends on VAT being recorded on each in­
voice; the so-called subtraction method would presumably re­
quire the same information on each invoice, hence the usual argu­
ment that comparing accounts rather than VAT collections and 
payments is nothing more than a more cumbersome way of doing 
what the invoice method accomplishes more easily. The illustra­
tion does, however, point out the fact that using this method per­
mits determination of the tax due without necessarily comparing 
actual collections and payments of the tax. Purchases, including 
capital purchases, are subtracted from net sales, and the tax is 
levied against the result. Where tax was collected or paid on each 
taxable transaction, the amount due (or refundable) using the 
subtraction method should exactly equal the balance due (or re­
fundable) in the VAT accounts, but if VAT were not levied as a 
transaction or indirect tax, the same amount could be collected 
by using a determination similar to the subtraction method. 
Handled in this manner, VAT could become a direct tax levied 
upon each business rather than an indirect tax on the consumer 
as it is generally supposed to be. VAT would then more closely 
resemble the Michigan BAT and, in some respects, the present 
corporate income tax.
The final illustration, the addition method, simply considers all 
the accounts that are usually thought to reflect value added and 
adjusts these for non-taxable receipts otherwise included in pro­
fit, capital purchases, and changes in inventory in order to produce 
the VAT base. ( Exhibit 13, p. 57.) Such a computation could be 
made independently of actual collections and payments of the 
tax, and this would also lend itself to the imposition of VAT as a 
direct tax.
The illustrations are included primarily for completeness. While 
it is important to demonstrate the various methods of collection, 
and to point out that VAT could be levied as a direct tax, it is
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not recommended that VAT be handled in this manner. For an 
indirect transaction tax, the invoice method does appear to be 
the most appropriate means of determining liability, and this 
method has been universally adopted.
European Treatment of VAT 
and Possible U.S. Treatment
When Is the Tax Due?
Under the EEC ’s invoice method of determining VAT, in usual 
cases and as a practical matter, the rendering of the invoice 
determines when the VAT is due. This should not be confused 
with when the tax must actually be paid to the government. 
Strictly speaking, according to the EEC ’s second directive, VAT 
is due when the delivery of goods is made or the performance of 
services is completed. However, if payments for goods are made 
or if an invoice is issued before delivery is made or services are 
completed, a taxable event can arise when the payment is re­
ceived, or when the invoice is rendered, but only in the amount 
of the cash received or the invoice rendered. Delivery is consid­
ered made when shipment to the purchaser begins. The place 
where services are performed, where a right is conveyed, or 
where property is used or processed determines the place of 
service.
In the ordinary course, the invoice is rendered at the time of 
delivery or shortly thereafter, so, as indicated, the time of in­
voicing usually determines when the tax is due. In fact, many 
countries require an invoice to be issued within a certain time 
after delivery and, while there may be room for skulduggery by 
juggling invoice dates, the supplier or seller usually wants his 
money just as quickly as the government wants its tax. Thus, the 
government usually has little to worry about in collection of the 
VAT. It may be that companies would hold up invoicing ship­
ments made in the last week of a taxable period, but if collection 
of the selling price is delayed a week by this maneuver, the loss 
of the total proceeds for a week may offset any gain in holding 
the VAT proceeds for a longer period.
Although there is the problem of long-term contracts by which 
delivery will not be completed for, say, more than a year, be­
cause VAT remittances are based on invoices, most of the EEC
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countries conform to the directive. One important aspect from 
the supplier’s point of view is that an interim invoice should 
never be in an amount higher than he is going to collect.
As to when the collected VAT must be turned over to the 
government, the second directive provides that a tax return must 
be filed monthly and the tax due must be paid with the return. 
It also provides for a relaxation of this provision in the case of 
certain taxpayers, mostly small traders. Most of the EEC  member 
states conform to this directive although the return due dates 
vary from ten days after the close of the preceding month in 
Germany to thirty days after such closing date in Italy.
Refunds
In the EEC countries, relatively minor refunds are generally 
made in the form of credits against the tax due for the following 
month. However, where the refund is substantial and likely to 
exceed the following month’s tax due, the refund procedure varies 
considerably from country to country. (There is no paragraph 
in the directives dealing with a refund procedure except in the 
case of the tax paid on purchase of capital goods.) In Germany, 
for example, the practice is to refund within three weeks after 
the return is filed; whereas, in France, refunds are made quar­
terly or even annually, depending on the amount.
From the standpoint of fairness, the taxpayer should have an 
option whether to receive a refund or to carry forward a credit. 
For example, a supplier such as a toy manufacturer that sells 
40 percent of his annual volume in one month should not be bur­
dened with carrying VAT on his purchases in inventory until he 
disposes of the inventory several months later. Refunds should be 
made within fifteen days after the monthly report is filed. If they 
are not made promptly, it could lead to a manipulation of dates 
of invoices by taxpayers on their own part and on the part of 
their suppliers. If a government insists on having its tax no later 
than, say, fifteen days after the month in which it became due, it 
should be prepared to refund an overpayment within a commen­
surate period of time.
Small Traders
In the EEC, the small trader—one whose annual gross receipts 
do not exceed a specified amount—is exempt from the usual VAT
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provisions; that is, he is not required to collect the usual VAT, 
but he is required to pay a VAT on purchases unless he purchases 
from another small trader. In Italy and the United Kingdom, 
there is an outright exemption for traders whose receipts do not 
exceed the equivalent of $20,000 and in Germany and Belgium a 
special tax is imposed at a lower rate for small traders. Thus, in 
the EEC there is no uniformity of treatment of small traders, 
other than to grant them special treatment.
To a great extent, the treatment of small traders by a country 
would depend on the literacy of its people, their “tax morality,” 
and the political consequences of imposing a VAT collection 
system on every trader. A further consideration is the cost of com­
plying with the law. If a VAT were imposed in the United States, 
there would be no great need for special treatment of small 
traders. Under U.S. local sales tax laws, small retailers are not 
usually exempt from the collection and return procedures—the 
corner candy store collects a tax on every sale—so a precedent 
has been established for treating small traders in the same man­
ner as other taxpayers. However, if a VAT return became too 
diff i cult to prepare because of varied rates, a case might be made 
for using a single rate for small traders, but, except at the retail 
level, it is not likely that a small trader would be dealing in 
different types of goods or services subject to different rates.
In the United States, there may have to be provisions for 
special treatment for retailers (not necessarily small traders) of 
low-priced goods who sell such goods one at a time and who do 
not ordinarily issue invoices. ( Under the EEC ’s second directive, 
invoices are required to be rendered on sales by taxpayers.) In 
such cases a cash register receipt might qualify as an invoice. The 
VAT due from such retailers would have to be determined by 
reference to something other than invoices, in any event, because 
most of their sales would be to “nontaxpayers,” that is, to ulti­
mate consumers.
Exemptions and Zero Rating
The genesis of every exception to any tax, whether it is by ex­
emption, deduction, or reduced rate is the attempt to meet some 
social, economic, or political objective that is deemed desirable. 
If, then, the ideal method of imposing a tax is to keep exceptions 
to a minimum or eliminate them altogether, there is bound to be
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a conflict with social, economic, and political ideas.
For example, in the United States there are exceptions to the 
income tax in the form of exemptions for religious, charitable, 
and educational institutions, local governments, and for pension 
and profit-sharing trusts. Moreover, if a taxpayer shares his in­
come with any of the exempt organizations, he is entitled to a 
deduction for this sharing. In the case of religious, charitable, 
and educational institutions their favorable treatment is, the argu­
ment runs, linked with their promotion of the common good and, 
therefore, contributions to them should be encouraged, not dis­
couraged, by tax factors. Examples of exceptions in the form of 
reduced rates are the capital gains tax rates, which have the effect 
of encouraging investments in worthwhile enterprises. All of the 
exceptions are consistent with worthwhile objectives, but they do 
present problems as shown by the volumes of tax cases, regula­
tions, and rulings in these areas. The point is, however, that all 
exceptions are related to social, economic, or political factors— 
factors that vary in degree from country to country. This point 
should be kept in mind in the following paragraphs where it is 
shown that one VAT country, or maybe all, exempt a particular 
activity from the VAT.
In the value-added tax system, the exceptions to the norm are 
by exemption or by reduced rate, including zero rating. They can 
be approached in two ways: first, from the aspect of the seller 
and, second, from the aspect of the purchaser. In the first, the 
seller would be exempted from collecting a tax no matter to whom 
he sells; in the second, the seller would be exempted from col­
lecting a tax on sales to specified purchasers only. (A reduced rate 
could be applied in the same manner.) For example, if a charita­
ble institution is engaged in selling books, all of its sales might be 
exempt were it decided to exempt such institutions from the 
tax. Or sales of books to the institution might be exempt because 
the sales are made to a charitable organization. In the EEC, the 
approach is the first method; that is, the selling activity is exempt 
and the purchaser’s category is ignored. There are minor excep­
tions to this approach in France, but the vast majority of ex­
emptions are applied to activities, not to purchasers, although it 
could be said the zero rating of exports is in effect an exemption 
applicable to a purchaser.
The EEC  Council had this to say about exceptions: “Since the
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introduction of zero rates creates difficulties, it is highly desirable 
to keep exemptions within very narrow limits and, where tax 
relief is deemed necessary, to provide for the application of re­
duced rates which should be high enough to normally permit the 
deduction of the tax paid at the preceding stage. . ."2 The Coun­
cil recognized that the agricultural area would present problems, 
so it left exemptions in that area up to the member states. In the 
service area, member states were given a great deal of discretion; 
however, they were directed not to exempt—
1. Licensing or sale of patents and other intangibles;
2. Architectural, engineering, and other services;
3. Services in the advertising area; and
4. Domestic shipment and storage of goods.
Treatment of VAT Within Specific Activities
With the foregoing exceptions in mind, the treatment of specific 
activities in the VAT countries is examined.
Educational Institutions
In most cases within the EEC, tuition fees and room fees are 
exempt; however, books sales by these institutions are taxable in 
some countries and exempt in others. In the United States, private 
educational institutions might be better off subject to the tax. For 
many institutions, tuition fees make up less than half their gross 
receipts; if they are engaged in a large capital improvement 
program, the VAT paid on expenditures for improvement would 
be recovered only if they were subject to tax. An exemption from 
VAT could result in still higher tuition fees since the VAT paid 
would not be recovered, but a zero rating, which would result 
in the recovery of VAT paid, should not result in any increase in 
tuition fees. Since educational institutions have always received 
favorable treatment in U.S. tax laws, both federal and local, there 
is no reason to believe that such treatment would be discontinued 
with a VAT. The zero rating of such institutions, however, has
2 1 CCH Common Market Reporter, Paragraph 3135 (Unofficial CCH Trans­
lation of Second Council Directive originally issued in French and German).
29
nothing to do with equity; it merely advances the social objective 
of benefitting them and their students.
Health Services
Doctors’ and nurses’ services are uniformly exempt throughout 
the EEC. Only in France are private hospital services subject to 
tax. Sale of prescription drugs is subject to tax in some countries, 
exempt in others, and zero rated in the United Kingdom. The 
sale of nonprescription drugs is uniformly subject to tax. In the 
United States there is no reason why sales of drugs and medicine 
should be subject to tax.
Hospital Care
It must be remembered that in the European communities 
health care is far more a function of the government than it is in 
the United States. Hospital care is taxable in all countries except 
the United Kingdom, where it is zero rated. It is estimated that 
the United States has relatively far more patients treated in pri­
vate hospitals than the United Kingdom has, for example, so that 
when hospital care services are taxed in the United Kingdom, the 
tax is more likely to apply to private hospitals for the wealthy 
rather than private hospitals of the sort that are a part of the 
general U.S. system. Thus, the taxing of hospitals in the EEC 
should not necessarily be looked to as a precedent for taxing or 
exempting here.
Charitable Institutions
Educational institutions are somewhat akin to charitable insti­
tutions, and they probably should be treated in the same manner, 
although charitable institutions are not likely to have the “plant” 
that educational institutions do. In the United States, both 
charitable and educational institutions are treated favorably for 
income and sales tax purposes, so it is not likely that they would 
be treated any less favorably for VAT purposes. Exempting their 
services from the collection of tax would be no great problem; 
however, there could be a problem if their purchases were ex­
empt from tax. This would mean that all goods purchased would 
have to be analyzed to determine the amount of VAT previously 
attributed to them. A way around this would be for the seller to 
collect a VAT from the institution and then have the institution 
claim a refund from the government for the tax it paid, in other
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words, make it a zero rated taxpayer for its charitable and edu­
cational services. Where such institutions, however, have trans­
actions that compete with private business, it would seem that 
they should be subject to the same rates to which private business 
is subject.
Real Estate
Transfers of real estate, whether it is improved or unimproved, 
are not contemplated as being part of a VAT system by the EEC. 
In the first directive, the EEC clearly states that the system is 
based on the imposition of a general consumption tax. Unim­
proved real estate is neither “consumed” nor produced; thus 
there is no “value added” to unimproved real estate. Moreover, 
in most EEC countries a separate tax other than VAT is imposed 
on the total value of real property transfers. To tax a transfer 
under two systems seems neither practical nor politic. If more 
revenue from such transactions is desired, an increase in rates of 
the separate tax would be easier than making the transactions 
subject to a transfer tax. Italy is a notable exception to the gen­
eral rule, since it does impose VAT on sales of improved real 
estate (the improvements only) when sold through a dealer.
The same directive holds that construction of real property is 
subject to the VAT; that is, the builder would charge the pur­
chaser a tax on his invoices for construction of the building. How­
ever, the purchaser adds no value to the building, unless of course 
he has improvements to the property made by a contractor, 
in which case he will pay the contractor a VAT on the amount 
of the latter’s invoice. (In  the majority of cases it is a question 
of whether the labor involved in home improvements made by the 
do-it-yourselfer adds any value to his property.) Thus, ordinarily 
no value is considered added by the owner who has not been sub­
jected to tax. This is not to say that a tax could not be imposed 
on the transfer of real property, but, strictly speaking, it would 
not be a VAT. As a matter of fact, the proposed sixth directive, 
if passed as it now reads, would tax transfers of buildings and 
land on which a building is to be erected by a taxable person, 
generally one engaged in business. However, after the first sale 
only the difference between the purchase price and the selling 
price would be taxable.
On the other hand, rentals of commercial property are treated
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differently by most countries. Here the theory is that the lessor 
is in a business and has paid a VAT on the improvements of his 
business property. He then rents the property to a lessee who is 
the ultimate consumer of the property, the owner merely being 
a middleman between the contractor and the lessee—a middleman 
who has added value to the property in the form of services and 
profit. Thus, unlike the case of sales of real property, rentals of 
such property for commercial use are subject to VAT. In some 
cases, there is no essential difference between rentals of property 
and sales of property; however, to treat the two transactions in 
the same manner ( either both exempt or both taxable) could re­
sult in greater problems than it would solve.
In the United States, where there are no significant state or 
local real estate transfer taxes and none at the federal level, a 
VAT on real estate transfers could be imposed, although it would 
not be in keeping with the principle of the tax. The political and 
social questions of taxing such transfers at any significant rate 
would be the principal obstacles in the way of such a tax.
Rents on Residential Property
In most VAT countries, rentals of residential property are 
either exempted or zero rated. For years, many European coun­
tries have had shortages of residential property, so severe a short­
age that laws have been passed in France and the United King­
dom, for example, holding that residential property cannot be 
converted into commercial property unless “replacement” resi­
dential property is constructed elsewhere. Thus, it has not been 
considered desirable to tax rents of residential property that 
would increase the rental to the lessee at a time when rental 
property is already at a premium.
In some of the larger U.S. cities, the same holds true. More­
over, by not taxing such rents, one regressive aspect of a VAT is 
eliminated. The two greatest expenditures of low-income groups 
are food and housing, accounting for perhaps anywhere from 
50 to 90 percent of lower-income groups’ costs.
Food and Food Products
In keeping with all consumption taxes imposed on a propor­
tional basis, the VAT is considered to be regressive. Again to re­
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duce regressive tendencies of VAT, sales of food and food prod­
ucts are, by and large, subjected to a lower rate of tax in the EEC. 
Only the United Kingdom, among the major countries, zero rates 
food sales. No country exempts them because the selling com­
panies would not be able to recover the VAT they paid on their 
substantial amounts of purchases. As has been pointed out, the 
sting of regression of the tax can be eliminated or reduced by a 
proper application of the revenues or an equivalent income tax 
reduction or refund procedure. Thus, the objectives of keeping 
regression out while keeping simplicity in can be achieved.
In every country, restaurant sales are subject to the VAT, and 
because such sales are now subject to sales taxes in the United 
States, it is not likely that there would be any exemption for them 
under a VAT.
Used Equipment
Sales of used equipment by businesses are taxed by all coun­
tries. On the other hand, sales of used items by private individuals 
are not. While the imposition of VAT on used equipment seems 
to violate the principle that an article should not be taxed twice 
because it cannot be consumed twice, the problem is most ap­
parent in competition between used equipment dealers and new 
equipment dealers. For example, if new equipment is subject to a 
20 percent VAT and used equipment is not, the question of 
whether to buy a new car or a used car may well be decided on 
the basis of the 20 percent tax differential alone. This would have 
a particularly serious effect where there is a newly imposed high- 
rate VAT. When the used car market consists of cars that have 
been subjected to the VAT, the price spread between a used car 
and a new car should not be as great as it was when the used 
car market consisted of cars not originally subjected to the VAT. 
However, here the principle of supply and demand would come 
into play. If a VAT were imposed, thus reducing the spread be­
tween the new and used cars, would prices for used cars go up— 
and how much? These questions can only be posed speculatively 
until a VAT is actually levied.
Another problem is the potential for driving used car dealers 
out of business. If the used car dealer is subject to the VAT but 
the nondealer is not, the exempt purchaser of a used car would
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naturally tend to buy from the nondealer rather than from the 
dealer.
Lease of Tangible Property
In every EEC country the lessor of personal property is sub­
ject to the VAT, One problem in this category arises when the 
rental is essentially a financing transaction. That is, the customer 
rents the machine from the lessor for ten years, say, at $1,000 
per year with an option to buy at a minimum cost expected to be 
considerably below the market value of the machine. In essence, 
the lessee has purchased the machine. An outright purchase at 
the beginning of the ten-year period would have cost the lessee, 
say, $5,000. Thus the difference is due to interest payable to the 
“lessor” for financing the transaction. Only in the United King­
dom would such a transaction be treated as a financing transac­
tion and the interest portion be exempt from VAT. Does the im­
position of VAT in those cases result in any hardship to the pur­
chaser? If  the purchaser is an exempt person, there could be an 
added cost that would encourage him to borrow money from a 
bank to purchase the asset outright. This problem could exist 
even when the leasing transaction is not tantamount to a financ­
ing transaction but becomes especially acute when form rather 
than substance governs the imposition of the tax. The proposed 
sixth directive, however, would treat rentals with options to pur­
chase as sales transactions.
Financial Transactions
None of the EEC countries extends its VAT provisions to loans 
and deposits; that is, the interest paid is not subject to the VAT, 
It is noteworthy that in many countries financial institutions are 
subject to a separate tax. Further, this nontaxability is somewhat 
in keeping with the principle of a consumption VAT because 
there is nothing, neither goods nor services, consumed to any ex­
tent. Certainly, no services are performed by a depositor when 
he deposits money in a financial institution. There is to a degree a 
consumption of services when a financial institution makes a loan 
to a customer; however, the interest income attributable to such 
services makes up a relatively small part of the total interest 
receipts, and it is questionable whether a VAT should be imposed 
on the entire amount of any interest received by a financial
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institution. A lower rate of VAT would solve the problem but 
could create others, especially among banks of different cate­
gories, such as savings banks that make mortgage loans to exempt 
persons as compared to commercial banks that make loans to tax­
able businesses that will recover any VAT paid on interest. Thus, 
in these situations, social and political problems would be of para­
mount concern.
To the extent banks are involved in other than strictly financial 
transactions, such as leasing or consulting for a fee, they should be 
treated just as other taxpayers engaged in those fields are treated, 
as is usual in the EEC. Lessors of property would have to revise 
their methods of operations if they could not compete success­
fully with financial institutions because of a VAT.
Government Services
The treatment of government services can be a serious problem. 
If the government competes with private business and is not 
taxed, while private services are, private services could be driven 
out of business. There are two possible solutions: (1 ) subject 
the government services to tax or (2 ) zero rate the private ser­
vices. In the EEC countries, the first method is generally favored 
as more practical because it is easier to tax all government ser­
vices than to determine which private services compete with 
government services and therefore should be zero rated.
Transportation
Transportation services are generally subject to VAT un­
less the goods are destined for export. If cross-border land 
transportation involves passengers, most countries would charge 
VAT for that portion of the fare attributable to travel within the 
country. The one general exception to this is international air 
transportation of passengers, which is zero rated by all countries. 
Because in most cases such transportation is government owned 
or subsidized and there is no private competition, the taxing 
of the services would be somewhat academic.
Other than the transportation of goods across international 
boundaries, there would not appear to be any reason for special 
treatment for transportation in the United States. International 
transport of passengers might also be zero rated because every 
VAT country now zero rates such services. To do otherwise might
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result in undue burdens for U.S. carriers in competition with 
foreign carriers—certainly, roundtrip tickets on U.S. carriers would 
become a thing of the past.
Comparison of VAT to Other Taxes
The question of whether the United States should have a VAT 
should be considered within the different circumstances under 
which such a VAT might be imposed. That is, should VAT re­
place or supplement the federal corporate income tax, the federal 
individual income tax, the employment taxes, property taxes, or 
excise taxes? Furthermore, were VAT to be imposed, would it be 
as a retail sales tax rather than as a levy in its more usual form, or 
would it be collected as a direct tax on business? By considering 
VAT in each of these contexts, specific advantages and disad­
vantages become more apparent.
VAT vs. the Federal Corporate Income Tax
It is unlikely that VAT (as an indirect tax) would ever be sub­
stituted entirely for a federal corporate income tax. Thus, the 
question of which is the “better” tax is largely academic. In com­
paring the two types of taxes, the argument is usually advanced 
that the corporate income tax is progressive whereas VAT is re­
gressive. However, some point out that to the extent that cor­
porate tax is shifted to the consumer, it is not progressive but 
regressive and, therefore, no different from VAT. Unfortunately, 
economists are divided on whether there is an actual forward 
shifting of the corporate income tax. One exhaustive study says it 
is shifted in its entirety, but other studies have questioned this 
conclusion and taken issue with it on the matter of how much, if 
any, corporate tax is shifted.
The more practical question might be whether any additional 
corporate taxes resulting from an increase in the corporate in­
come tax rate would be passed on to the consumer. One could 
speculate about this, but clearly, if VAT were enacted, a shift 
would appear more likely, so that the greater part of the tax in­
crease would probably be passed on to the consumer. However, 
if the proceeds of VAT were spent to provide services for the 
people taxed, in the same or in a greater proportion than the tax 
is collected from them, the regressive affect would be obviated.
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It has also been said that there is really no comparison between 
VAT and the corporate income tax. The VAT base is so much 
broader than the corporate income tax base that, if substantial 
additional revenues were needed, there would be little question 
about where they might best be raised. For example, the base for 
the corporate income tax in 1974 was $105 billion (estimated) 
yielding a corporate income tax of $39 billion. The base for VAT 
could vary from 500 billion to one trillion dollars, depending on 
what is exempted. A 10 percent VAT could, therefore, yield from 
50 billion to 100 billion dollars. And, a 15 percent VAT would 
yield half again those amounts. Of course, there is no present 
intention to raise such vast sums by means of VAT, but the 
figures illustrate the revenue potential. For some, this very po­
tential raises the question of whether VAT, once introduced, 
would not be too extensive a source of governmental funds.
The very much larger base illustrates another point—all busi­
ness would contribute to VAT collections while all do not now 
contribute to income tax collections. The marginal producer 
would have to shoulder a VAT tax “burden” while he can be said 
to be protected now from this burden because his taxable income 
is minimal.
With all transactions subject to tax, there is little opportunity 
for tax planning. For this reason, VAT has been considered a 
more neutral tax in that it can rarely affect business decisions in 
the way an income tax can. In addition, because it is not levied 
against income, it is also held to be far more neutral in its effect 
on capital formation.
Taking these various points, it seems clear that there may well 
be a place for VAT (or some other form of sales tax) as a com­
plement to the federal corporate income tax system. While there 
are a number of unresolved questions (principally the difference 
in regression between a VAT and the corporate income tax), 
VAT has certain admitted features which make it worth con­
sidering as a complementary tax on business.
VAT vs. the Federal Individual Income Tax
Of all taxes levied by the federal government, the personal in­
come tax yields the greatest revenue. Its progressivity and suc­
cessful self-assessment procedure have been matters of pride 
among many American economists and tax administrators. The
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likelihood of its ever being completely replaced by a VAT is 
practically nil. Nor is it likely that VAT would be used to reduce 
the personal income tax rates because of its apparent regressive 
nature, certainly when compared to the progressive individual in­
come tax rate structure. Although VAT may be made less re­
gressive by special rates, credits, exemptions, and rebates (and 
probably would have to be if introduced in the United States), 
such features would make it administratively more complex.
In summary, a VAT as even a partial substitute for the federal 
individual income tax system appears unwarranted. If VAT were 
adopted because of its favorable effects on business, certain fea­
tures of the present income tax system might require modifica­
tion so as to improve the system’s progressivity ( higher minimum 
tax, less “preferential” income excluded, change in capital gains 
taxation, and so forth).
VAT vs. Other Indirect Taxes
Em ploym ent Taxes. Both a VAT and the social security tax on 
employees’ wages are regressive in that they fall more heavily, as 
a percentage of income, on the lower-income group than they do 
on those with higher incomes. On the surface, it may appear that 
the VAT is a more regressive tax; however, since employers now 
pay one-half the social security taxes, there seems little doubt 
that this cost, too, is passed on to the consumer. Thus, there 
would appear to be no difference between the two regarding who 
bears the ultimate tax burden.
The total amount of social security taxes collected in 1973 was 
$55 billion. This means that a VAT would have to be levied in 
the 9 percent range if an equal amount of revenue were to be 
collected. VAT need not be entirely substituted for social se­
curity taxes; however, as benefits are increased, an alternative 
source for funding them will have to be found, and, as an al­
ternative, VAT might be appropriate.
Property Taxes. In January, 1972, then President Nixon raised 
specific questions about the present system of property taxes as 
levied by the state and local governments. One reason for ques­
tioning the system was the appearance of the “Serrano” type 
decisions holding that local financing of education by the present 
system of property taxes is unconstitutional. While a commission
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appointed to study the question has concluded that property tax 
relief is not generally justified and, thus, VAT would not be an 
appropriate substitute at this time, the effort to switch from the 
traditional source of financing of public education ( as in the fore­
going case of social security benefits) has to require a more thor­
ough analysis of VAT as an alternative in this context. Even after 
modification, it is doubtful that the income taxes, personal or 
corporate, could carry the full burden if the aim was to signifi­
cantly lower property taxes.
Excise Taxes. There would be little advantage in replacing the 
present federal excise taxes with a value-added tax. The system 
of tax collection on alcohol, tobacco, utilities, and so forth works 
extremely well with a minimum of administrative problems for 
taxpayers or the government. In fact, this very ease of collection 
of over $16 billion  annually apparently helps to tip the balance in 
favor of retaining excise taxes each time they are due to expire.3 
The trend is toward user taxes to support such conveniences as 
highways and airport facilities. The taxes on alcohol, tobacco, 
and gasoline perhaps also act as a deterrent to excess consump­
tion, with some social benefits.
VAT v$. Retail Sales Tax
Both the VAT imposed in Europe and the retail sales tax are 
forms of consumption tax, but the literature comparing a VAT 
to a retail tax is surprisingly sparse—surprising because in the 
United States, we probably have had more experience with the 
retail sales tax than any other country, and it is natural to com­
pare a VAT and a retail sales tax.
As to comparisons between the VAT and the retail sales tax 
(R ST ), the volume. W hat You Should Know About the Value 
A dded Tax,4 has this to say:
1. A VAT system involves many more tax returns than an RST 
system. (This is the only disadvantage, the rest are all advan­
tages or are neutral.) 
3 See Exhibit 14, p. 58.
4 D. T. Smith, J. B. Webber, C. M. Cerf, What You Should Know About 
The Value Added Tax (Homewood, Ill.: Dow Jones, 1973).
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2. A VAT tends to cover the service sector of the economy 
more broadly than the RST.
3. Neither the consumption VAT nor the RST is a tax deterrent 
to capital expenditures.
4. A VAT is simpler in operation for commercial customers: it 
does not require resale certificates or exemption certificates, for 
example.
5. A VAT, since it is collected at every stage, is easier to enforce 
than an RST.
6. The VAT is completely rebated on exports, whereas under an 
RST, a portion of the sales tax on supplies, for example, may not 
be rebated or arbitrary allotments input may need to be used.
These advantages are listed by other writers on the subject and 
one is hard put to list any more. In the United States one could 
argue that the RST should be reserved to the states, and if a 
consumption tax is imposed by the federal government it should 
be some other type, such as the VAT. This argument has some 
political basis; but then other questions arise, such as, Should the 
VAT be imposed at the retail level? If it is not, would this lead 
to the end of independent wholesalers and retailers? If both taxes 
are imposed, the problem of coordinating them arises.
Moreover, if a VAT is not imposed at the retail level would 
the VAT be more simply imposed under the subtraction or addi­
tion method rather than the invoice method. The experience of 
Michigan’s BAT would have some bearing here. At the time of 
its demise, the Michigan BAT was working well. However, where 
either the addition or subtraction method is used, one could well 
ask why not use the income tax that is already in existence, re­
move some of its deductions, and, in effect, move toward a VAT. 
This elasticity of a VAT makes it a phenomenon among taxes. On 
one extreme (subtraction method) it is an income tax, on the 
other (invoice method) it is a sales tax.
Not one of these advantages clearly demonstrates that a VAT 
is superior to any retail sales tax currently in operation. Never­
theless, in a nation that taxes its citizens at various levels of gov­
ernment (e.g., state and federal) it may be politically feasible to 
reserve one type of indirect tax to one level and another type to 
another level. It would appear, however, that the imposition of a 
single indirect tax can be much more efficient than the impo­
sition of two different, broad-based consumption taxes.
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3Conclusions and Observations
Since the value-added tax first began to be discussed with some 
seriousness as a potential addition to the taxing system of this 
country, a number of developments have occurred that, taken 
together, would seem to give added support to the push for 
greater reliance on an indirect tax in the United States. There 
appear to be three principal developments.
First, one of the most significant trading areas with which the 
United States must compete is an enlarged Common Market, all 
nine members of which now have operating VAT systems. For 
whatever reason, many industrialized countries are placing grow­
ing reliance on an indirect tax system. The United States com­
petes for world markets with these countries, and to the extent 
its exported goods bear hidden cost for income taxes while the 
exported goods of other countries have been relieved of an in­
direct tax cost through the normal operation of the VAT system, 
U.S. goods may be placed at a disadvantage. If the U.S. corporate 
income tax rates were increased, or the income tax base broad­
ened, any existing disparity (see Exhibit 9) would simply be 
increased.
Second, the need for additional tax revenues in the United 
States is persistent. While either through reform or an increase 
in rates, it is possible that the income tax system can be used to 
meet this need, there remains the fundamental question of how 
much additional income tax can really be collected without 
severe distortion of the existing tax base. Clearly, the corporate 
income tax is a limited source, so that, without an alternative to
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it, already burdensome individual income taxes must contribute 
the greatest share.
Third, added to the need for additional revenue, is the growing 
call for less reliance on certain taxes that have traditionally been 
imposed: namely, the social security tax and real property tax 
systems. Both are regressive and both have climbed materially 
over the past several years. In fact, VAT may have gained cer­
tain adherents from among its former critics as a result of the 
growth of these taxes.
As a result of the foregoing, it would seem that imposition of 
an indirect tax at the federal level merits serious consideration. 
This does not necessarily mean that a traditional VAT should be 
recommended for the United States; admittedly, many of the 
reasons that dictated a VAT system for the Common Market are 
inapplicable in the United States. However, a federally adminis­
tered retail sales tax system might well be an appropriate source 
for U.S. revenue requirements. A retail sales tax is already 
familiar; it is imposed by most states and, properly modified, 
would appear to accomplish all of the objectives of a VAT.
The last point should be carefully noted. Retail sales and use 
taxes collected by the states do not at present begin to accom­
plish the objectives of a national VAT system. They are not uni­
versally utilized; there are important exceptions to their applica­
tion, particularly with respect to services; the rates differ as do 
exemptions; and, most importantly, they are not a source of fed­
eral revenue. Nevertheless, a federally administered retail sales 
tax system could be devised to cover all these points, and if such 
a system were designed, it might well substitute fully and ade­
quately for a federal VAT.
In all probability, the retail trade will not favor this alternative 
to a traditional VAT. Although retailers will collect no different 
an amount from customers under one system or the other, the full 
effect of a federal sales tax will fall on their sales volumes. To the 
extent such a tax is absorbed by the seller, the retailer will bear 
the entire collection burden, whereas under a VAT system, pro­
ducers earlier in the chain of distribution will have had to con­
sider the effect of the tax on their sales price and thus may have 
shared in absorbing some of the economic impacts of the tax. A 
retail sales tax also requires the government to rely entirely on 
this one group for its indirect tax revenues. Within a retail sales
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tax system, revenue is collected later and usually at a lower rate 
than it is within a VAT system; a retail sales tax system could 
leave too large an amount to be collected at the end of the chain 
and too large a possibility for evasion at this one level.
If for these and other reasons it is determined that a federal 
retail sales tax is not feasible, and a federal VAT is introduced, it 
should conform as closely as possible to the classical system. Any 
U.S. VAT system should be of the consumption type covering cap­
ital purchases. There should be as few exceptions as possible, 
with reliance on zero rating rather than exemptions where relief 
is necessary. Ideally there should be a single rate. From a polit­
ical standpoint, if VAT is introduced into the United States (or, 
for that matter, a federal retail sales tax), the worst features of 
regression would probably have to be curbed by credits, rebates, 
and so forth. The low-income groups would have to be given 
relief, even if the additional revenues generated by the tax were 
intended to finance social benefits of which they would receive 
the greatest share.
An important aspect of introducing a federal VAT or retail 
sales tax is the effect on the state retail sales tax systems. Pre­
sumably VAT could be administered as a separate system more 
easily than a federal retail sales tax, but it is also clear that the 
existence of two such tax systems side by side could be un­
desirable. Already, there is considerable support for “piggy­
backing” state income taxes and grafting them onto the federal 
system for collection and administration. Ideally, the federal gov­
ernment could collect all VAT or retail sales taxes and remit a 
predetermined portion to each state. In fact, a VAT system 
might permit the federal government to remit revenue to the 
states where value was in fact added, rather than simply to the 
states where the final retail sale took place, as would be the case 
under the traditional sales tax setup. Obviously, such a single 
system would require a nationwide rate if either a VAT system or 
a federal retail sales tax system were adopted. While this would 
appear to encroach upon the right of the states to determine tax 
rates locally, the present trend toward revenue sharing promises 
to have much the same long-term effect. The tendency, then, 
would be to harmonize transaction taxes as levied by the various 
states and thus to remove some of the inequities that exist be­
tween the various states and that continue to affect interstate
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commerce. The point can be made that if Europe can harmonize 
its tax systems within the Common Market, the United States 
can certainly accomplish the same sort of internal harmonization 
with considerable overall benefit to business.
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Eff ects of an Exempt Sale at 
Wholesale and Retail Levels*
EXHIBIT 8
All Sales Exempt Exempt
Taxable Wholesaler Retailer
Manufacturer sells
to wholesaler:
Sales price 100 100 100
VAT at 10% 10 10 10
Total cost 110 110 110
Wholesaler sells to
retailer;
Total cost 110 110 110
Prepaid VAT ( 10) — ( 10)
Valued added 100 100 100
Sales price 200 210 200
VAT at 10% 20 — 20
Total cost 220 210 220
Retailer sells to
consumer;
Total cost 220 210 220
Prepaid VAT ( 20) — —
Value added 200 200 200
Sales price 400 410 420
VAT at 10% 40 41 —
Total cost 440 451 420
* Comparison of situation where all sales in a cycle are subject to VAT with 
result where:
1. An exempt sale occurs midway in the cycle.
2. An exempt sale occurs at the end of the cycle.
It is assumed that all maintained the same “value added” which would be 
unlikely considering differences in efficiency and the effect of the tax cost 
itself.
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EXHIBIT 9
Comparison of Export Sales in Third Countries
Exporter Exporter
o f the o f  a  VAT
United States Country
Selling price to customer in
Morocco $150.00 $150.00
Manufacturing cost 100.00 100.00
Insurance and freight 3.00 3.00
Duty (10% ad valorem) 10.30 10.30
Value-added tax paid out —0— 10.00
Tax eliminated on export (10.00)
Total expense 113.30 113.30
Net profit before tax 36.70 36.70
Income tax (at 48%) 17.62 14.68 (a t  40%)
Net profit after tax $ 19.08 $ 22.02
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Income Tax Base Calculation
EXHIBIT 10
Sales, net of returns and allowances 
Cost of goods sold:
Beginning inventory $ 300,0002
Purchases 200,0001
Direct labor 400,0002
Supplies, etc. 100,0001
Total 1,000,000
Ending inventory ( 400,000)2
Gross profit
Salaries 100,0002
Services, etc. 50,0001
Supplies, etc. 50,0001
Rent 40,0002
Depreciation 30,0002
Interest and taxes 20,0002
Other deductions 10,0002
Net profit from operations 
Royalties
Income tax base 
Income tax due at 48%
$ 1,000,0001
600,000
400,000
( 300,000)
100,000
50,0002
$ 150,000
$ 72,000
1 Accounts utilized in determining VAT liability under either the invoice or 
subtraction method.
2 Accounts utilized in determining VAT liability under the addition method.
54
EXHIBIT 11
VAT Base Calculation— Invoice M ethod
Sales $1 ,000,000
VAT collected at 15% 
Purchases:
$ 150,000
Raw materials $200,000
Manufacturing supplies 100,000
Office services 50,000
Office supplies 50,000
Capital purchase 400,000
Total $800,000
VAT paid at 15%
VAT due
120,000
$ 30,000
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EXHIBIT 12
Without Including VAT in Prices
VAT Base C alculation— Subtraction M ethod
Sales
Purchases:
Raw materials 
Manufacturing supplies 
Off ice services 
Office supplies 
Capital purchase
$200,000
100,000
50,000
50,000 
400,000
$1,000,000
800,000
VAT base $ 200,000
VAT due at 15% $ 30,000
VAT collected at 15% of $1,000,000 
VAT paid at 15% of $800,000
$ 150,000 
120,000
VAT due as above $ 30,000
Including VAT in Prices
Sales including VAT 
Purchases including VAT
$1,150,000
920,000
VAT base $ 230,000
VAT due at 13.04% $ 30,000
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EXHIBIT 13
VAT Base Calculation— Addition M ethod
Direct labor 
Office salaries 
Rent
Depreciation
Interest and taxes
Other deductions
Profit for income tax purposes
$ 400,000 
100,000
40,000
30,000
20,000 
10,000
150,000
Royalties 
Capital purchase
$ 50,000 
400,000
750,000
450,000
Ending inventory 
Beginning inventory
400,000
(300,000)
300,000
(100,000)
VAT base $ 200,000
VAT due at 15% $ 30,000
VAT collected at 15% of $1,000,000 
VAT paid at 15% of $800,000
$ 150,000 
120,000
VAT due as above $ 30,000
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